Virtual CRT – Who You Gonna Call? – Executive Summary – April 22nd, 2026
I. Introduction
The Virtual Congressional Roundtable, “Who You Gonna Call?,” hosted by the Missile
Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA), convened seasoned senior defense leaders and
warfighters to address a critical and rapidly evolving threat: the vulnerability of U.S. military
bases—particularly in the Middle East—to missile, drone, and air attacks. The discussion
underscores an urgent need for reform in U.S. missile defense strategy, acquisition
processes, institutions, and operational doctrine in light of recent attacks attributed to Iran
and its proxies.
II. Core Problem
Participants emphasized U.S. forces currently lack sufficient capacity, capability, and
integration to defend forward-deployed bases against modern threats, including drones,
cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Despite years of warning signs—from conflicts in
Ukraine to earlier regional attacks—the U.S. has failed to adapt at the necessary speed.
Recent attacks have resulted in:
• Loss of American lives
• Destruction of high-value assets (e.g., aircraft, infrastructure)
• Billions of dollars in damages
The consensus: the current approach to base defense is inadequate and
Unsustainable.
III. Key Drivers of Failure
1. Cultural and Institutional Barriers
• Resistance within the Department of War to prioritize missile defense due to cost
and competing priorities
• Overreliance on legacy systems and traditional warfare assumptions (e.g., air
superiority)
• Failure to internalize the shift to an age of “missile and drone warfare”
2. Acquisition and Process Limitations
• Slow, risk-averse acquisition cycles (often 10–15 years)
• A “Valley of Death” where innovative technologies fail to transition to deployment
• Lack of clear ownership across services for base defense missions
3. Resource Misalignment
• Insufficient funding and prioritization of air and missile defense systems
• Overinvestment in expensive offensive systems (e.g., fighter aircraft) versus
scalable defensive solutions
• Lack of predictable demand signals for industry, limiting production scaling
4. Fragmented Command and Policy Structure
• Unclear roles between the Army and Air Force regarding base defense
responsibilities
• Failure to establish unified command, control, and acquisition authority
• Limited integration with allies and partners
IV. Changing Nature of Warfare
The discussion highlights a fundamental shift in modern conflict:
• Low-cost, high-volume threats (drones, loitering munitions) are dominating
battlefields
• Adversaries (Iran, Russia, China, & North Korea) are collaborating and adapting
rapidly
• Traditional reliance on expensive interceptors and manned aviation is increasingly
ineffective
Ukraine was cited as a leading example of innovation, demonstrating:
• Use of low-cost sensors and decentralized systems
• Rapid adaptation and integration of battlefield technologies
• Effective countermeasures against larger, more advanced adversaries
V. Immediate Risks
• U.S. bases remain highly vulnerable to continued attacks
• Current defenses rely on expensive, limited systems (e.g., air-to-air missiles)
against cheap threats
• Lack of layered defense forces commanders into tradeoffs between protecting
personnel and assets
• Similar vulnerabilities exist in the U.S. homeland, not just overseas
VI. Recommended Solutions
1. Immediate (Crisis Response)
• Rapid deployment of existing, proven, and scalable technologies
• Implementation of open-architecture command and control (C2) systems to
integrate sensors and effectors
• Increased use of passive defenses (dispersion, deception, & mobility)
• Leveraging commercial and allied capabilities
2. Near-Term (6–12 Months)
• Field affordable, attritable, layered defense systems
• Accelerate acquisition by bypassing traditional processes where necessary
• Expand partnerships with innovative small and mid-sized companies
• Provide industry with clear demand signals and funding commitments
3. Long-Term (Strategic Reform)
• Establish clear ownership and accountability for base defense missions
• Reform acquisition systems to operate at the “speed of relevance”
• Develop a layered, integrated base defense architecture combining offense and
defense
• Strengthen coalition-based defense systems with allies
• Align initiatives like Golden Dome with real-world operational needs
VII. Organizational and Structural Considerations
Participants debated multiple structural solutions:
• Assigning responsibility to a single service
• Creating a joint or independent organization
• Establishing a new unified command focused on integrated air and missile
defense, automation, data, AI, forward base defense, and offense-defense
Integration. While opinions varied, there was agreement that status quo structures are
insufficient and require reform.
VIII. Conclusion
The roundtable concluded with a clear and urgent message:
The United States is at a critical inflection point in missile and drone defense.
Failure to act will result in continued loss of life, strategic disadvantage, and erosion of
deterrence. The technology to address these challenges already exists—the primary
obstacles are culture, policy, prioritization, and execution speed.
The path forward requires:
• Immediate action
• Institutional change
• Sustained investment
• Integration across services, allies, and industry
Without these changes, the U.S. risks falling further behind in an era defined by rapid, lowcost, and highly adaptive threats.
Speakers:
Gen (Ret.) Glen VanHerck
Fomer Commander of NORTHCOM & NORAD
Lt Gen (Ret.) John Thomas
Former Deputy Commander PACAF
LTG (Ret.) Jamie Jarrard
Former Deputy Commanding General USARPAC
Mr. John Rood
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Mr. Riki Ellison
Founder & Chairman, MDAA