“Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, from Southern California, from Manhattan Beach, on a beautiful day here in Southern California. I’m Riki Ellison. I’m the founder and chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. Our mission is pure, simple, and powerful. Defending our people, our nation, and the world from ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones. And we’ve been doing this for over 20 years as an organization. And I’ve been doing this over 40 years as an organization, as a leader in this field.
This is our 99th Congressional Roundtable, and it’s appropriate to have it here in Southern California, where 40 years ago, President Ronald Reagan led the charge on the Strategic Defense Initiative here.
This virtual is a follow-up to who you’re going to call that we did on Monday on Ghostbusting. Our issue, missile defense, you can draw it all the way back to 83, has been ghosted. It has been ghosted as a theory from advocates against it, feeling that it was destabilizing to the world that created an armed race that didn’t. It was ghosted because the technologies said could never be done. But those ghostings were proven wrong.
And we can attest to the first Patriot shoot down in the early 90s. We can attest to the great movement the Aegis systems have done from Wayne Meyer and building the capability that shoots down on a regular basis in the early 2000s. And we validated missile defense technology works. No question.
Still ghosted. Still ghosted of our Department of War, our Department of Defense, never, ever moved more than one and a half percent, maybe, of its entire defense budget was spent on defense. Ghosted. Ghosted.
We continued to see the ghosting, especially in the funding and resources and the manpower of our air defense branch in the U.S. Army. Ghosted. And we’ve come to reality that you cannot ghost us anymore from what has happened today in the Middle East.
We have done, I’m going to put it in football terms, we did a phenomenal pass rush, blitz package, unblocked, unblocked, just crushing it. But we let the flat open and we got scored upon. And defense wins championships. They don’t score. They don’t win.
So we went over this very extensively with our board members in a great discussion on Monday. We have one of our board members here, retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, that I want to give him an opportunity to talk about ghost busting and the ghosting that we’ve had that’s happened over the last 40 years, but more recently, the last 12 years where systems have never come to the field.
IAMD has been neglected in this country and in the world. But those days are done. American lives are at stake, cost American lives, cost billions of dollars of infrastructure.
We also have Ty here, a fellow board member, who was with me in the conversation on Monday, and also the Air Force. And I want to give credit to the Air Force. They and the budget just announced $1.4 billion is going to go into air-based defense. We’ve seen another movement big time on automated command of $70 billion going into that drone defense and drone offense.
So that’s the discussion today.”
– Riki Ellison, 99th MDAA Virtual CRT
Executive Summary
Virtual Congressional Roundtable: “Ghostbusters” – Missile Defense and Air Base Defense Gaps
I. Introduction
The 99th Virtual Congressional Roundtable, hosted by Riki Ellison, Founder and Chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA), examined longstanding gaps in U.S. air and missile defense—particularly the persistent “ghosting” of integrated missile defense (IMD) in strategy, funding, and execution.
Ellison framed the discussion around the urgency created by recent operational experiences in the Middle East, arguing that missile defense is no longer theoretical or optional but a proven capability that has been historically under-resourced and under-prioritized.
II. Strategic Context: “Ghosting” of Missile Defense
Riki Ellison emphasized that for over four decades, missile defense has been dismissed or underfunded due to skepticism about feasibility, cost, and strategic stability. Despite demonstrated successes—from Patriot systems to Aegis intercepts—defense spending on missile defense has remained disproportionately low.
Ellison argued that recent conflicts have exposed the consequences of this neglect, particularly in defending forward-deployed forces and critical infrastructure. He underscored that the U.S. can no longer afford to “ghost” missile defense as threats from drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic systems proliferate.
III. Operational Lessons from Recent Conflicts
A. Performance Assessment and Opportunity
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery characterized recent air defense performance during operations against Iran as mixed:
- While missions continued, there were fatalities, injuries, and equipment losses.
- He framed the outcome not as failure, but as a critical learning opportunity, noting the U.S. avoided catastrophic consequences because it was not facing peer adversaries like China or Russia.
B. Core Strategic Failure: Roles and Missions Misalignment
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery identified a systemic failure in assigning responsibility for air and missile defense:
- Post-Iraq/Afghanistan, the U.S. failed to realign roles and missions for ground-based air defense.
- The Army, Air Force, and other services lack clear accountability for defending air bases and infrastructure.
- This ambiguity has created capability gaps, particularly in ground-based air defense.
IV. Key Capability Gaps Identified
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery outlined four major operational deficiencies:
1. Lack of Elevated Sensor Networks (JLENS / Aerostats)
- Programs like JLENS were abandoned due to risk aversion and lack of ownership.
- Elevated sensors are critical for persistent situational awareness and are actively used by allies like Israel.
2. Absence of Low-Cost Interceptors (IFPC Delays)
- The U.S. lacks affordable interceptors to counter low-cost threats (e.g., drones).
- Current reliance on high-cost systems (e.g., Patriot missiles) creates cost asymmetry.
3. Failure to Adopt Counter-Drone Interceptors
- Proven, low-cost Ukrainian systems were not adopted despite demonstrated effectiveness.
- RADM (Ret.) Montgomery cited this as a missed opportunity driven by institutional inertia or “hubris.”
4. Delays and Limitations in Command & Control (IBCS)
- The Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) remains slow to field and not fully operational, despite decades of development.
Additional Concern: GPS Vulnerability
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery highlighted the cancellation of the OCX program, delaying deployment of more resilient GPS signals (L5), leaving U.S. systems vulnerable to jamming and spoofing.
V. Cultural and Institutional Challenges
A. Department-Level Responsibility
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery argued that resolving these issues requires leadership from:
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
They must formally assign roles and responsibilities for integrated air and missile defense across services.
B. Air Force Perspective on Accountability
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jon “Ty” Thomas reinforced the need for service-level ownership, arguing:
- Responsibility should align with “who has the most at stake.”
- The Air Force should assume primary responsibility for air base defense, rather than relying on the Army.
- Past arrangements failed because defending another service’s assets was not prioritized under resource constraints.
C. Cultural Reform and Operational Transparency
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Thomas emphasized the importance of Air Force debrief culture, advocating for:
- Honest assessment of failures
- Rapid identification of deficiencies
- Institutional learning and accountability
VI. Domestic Vulnerabilities (CONUS Defense)
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Thomas raised concerns about insufficient defense of U.S.-based airfields, noting:
- Power projection platforms in the continental U.S. are vulnerable to drone and missile threats.
- Commanders lack clear authority and flexibility to deploy defensive systems due to regulatory constraints (e.g., FAA, domestic rules).
He called for policy changes to ensure commanders can rapidly employ kinetic and non-kinetic defenses when needed.
VII. Layered Defense and Operational Integration
Both RADM (Ret.) Montgomery and Ellison stressed the need for a layered defense architecture, including:
- Forward-deployed sensors and interceptors
- Integration of air and ground-based systems
- Coordination with allies for early engagement
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery noted that reliance on air-based intercepts alone (e.g., fighter aircraft) is insufficient, particularly for short-range or rapidly emerging threats.
VIII. Technology and Procurement Considerations
A. Directed Energy Limitations
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery cautioned that directed energy weapons are not yet mature, currently functioning only as last-resort defenses.
B. Need for Rapid Adaptation
- The Navy’s Aegis software updates were cited as a model for rapid iteration.
- The U.S. must adopt similar adaptive development cycles across missile defense systems.
IX. Budget and Policy Window
RADM (Ret.) Montgomery and Ellison highlighted a unique opportunity:
- A significant increase in defense funding (up to $1.45 trillion) creates a window to:
- Assign missions clearly
- Resource them adequately
- Avoid inter-service conflict
They stressed that new missions must be paired with funding to ensure execution.
X. Conclusion
The roundtable concluded with consensus that the era of neglecting missile defense is over.
Riki Ellison closed by emphasizing:
- Missile defense is now a recognized and urgent priority
- Future progress requires cultural change, process reform, and sustained investment
Across all speakers, the central message was clear, the United States must transition from reactive, fragmented missile defense efforts to a fully integrated, accountable, and layered defense architecture—before facing a more capable adversary.
Speakers:
Lt Gen (Ret.) Jon Thomas
Former Deputy Commander, Pacific Air Forces
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery
Former Director of Operations, U.S. Pacific Command
Mr. Riki Ellison
Founder & Chairman, MDAA