“This is our 96th Congressional Roundtable, and it’s a fun one. This is Riding Shotgun, from Death Valley to the Gold Rush. So, we’re going to cover that ride, Gold Rush, Golden Dome, and how that process is today, how we can make it better, quicker, more urgent for the warfighter and provide the warfighter and nations, because nations buy a lot of the missile defense from our country, as we’ve been ahead of it on that.
So, today, you know, when you create championship teams, you create world championship teams, everybody kind of thinks that it’s all about milk and cookie and having the right personalities, and everybody kumbaya. It’s not. You have to have superstars. You have to have a couple, Bill Walsh always says, with a team of 52, you only need two of them, two or three, because you get more than that, you have some issues with the whole team, but you have to have one, and I’m so excited that we have one that’s speaking to us today, and that is Shotgun Browning.
And I just want to express how I ran into Shotgun, because in Ukraine, they came to me about three years ago, with this instrument, which is an acoustic microphone. And it was phenomenal, and there are now, you know, 15,000, 20,000 of these all over Ukraine, all over their borders, all around their defended areas that are tracking class three Shaheds and intercepting them with automation with 30 mm and 50 cal.
So when I brought this, or they came to me, I brought this directly to the three combatant commanders, starting with USAFE General Hecker to present that, and they said to me, “Riki, you’ve got to go see Shotgun.” And I took it to NORTHCOM Combatant Command, and the warfighter was Glen, and he said, “Riki, take it to Shotgun.” And I went all the way to the Indo-Pacific, and “Riki, take it to Shotgun.”
So that tells you something, that’s our warfighters at the highest levels, you know, one guy in the department, in R&E, and he’ll explain his position to go to bring this. So that’s how I met Shotgun. And just phenomenal, energetic, I won’t say exotic, but I kind of get to, he is something special.
And he took that and ran with it. And we put it in our testing cycles throughout our country. And we got, obviously, NATO to purchase all those things for Ukraine.
They are desperately needed in Europe, but also in the Middle East. But I’d like just to introduce Shotgun here and let him introduce himself to all of us.”
—Riki Ellison, 96th MDAA Virtual CRT
Executive Summary
I. Introduction
The Virtual Congressional Roundtable “Riding Shotgun: Death Valley to Gold Rush” centered on one of the most urgent defense questions facing the United States: how to move promising missile defense, counter-drone, and command-and-control technologies out of the innovation pipeline and into the hands of the warfighter fast enough to matter. Hosted by MDAA Chairman Riki Ellison, the discussion featured Tom “Shotgun” Browning and focused on the structural barriers that slow defense innovation, the shortcomings of current acquisition culture, and the reforms needed to make Golden Dome and broader integrated missile defense efforts succeed. The central conclusion was that the problem is not a lack of technology. The problem is the system that governs how technology is developed, tested, funded, integrated, and fielded.
II. Strategic Context: Combat Is Moving Faster Than the Bureaucracy
Riki Ellison opened by grounding the discussion in the real-world urgency of current combat. He pointed to ongoing missile and drone attacks in the Middle East, especially against the UAE, as evidence both of the effectiveness of existing systems like THAAD and Patriot and of the remaining underlayer gap against drones such as Shaheds. From his perspective, the operational environment is already forcing a new standard of urgency. The challenge now is not whether innovation is needed, but whether the United States can move quickly enough to close gaps before they are exploited at greater scale.
III. The Valley of Death Is Primarily an Information Problem
A major theme of Browning’s remarks was that the so-called “Valley of Death” in defense acquisition is not simply a matter of funding. He argued that it is fundamentally an information problem. Technologists do not rapidly understand what warfighters truly need, and warfighters do not rapidly understand what technology makes possible. The defense enterprise remains divided into separate communities for science, prototyping, requirements, acquisition, and production, with each handing the problem off to another. This fragmentation creates delay, weakens accountability, and makes it far harder for useful ideas to survive the process.
IV. The Current Requirements Process Is Too Slow for Modern Warfare
Browning argued that the traditional requirements process is built for long-cycle platform procurement, not fast-moving combat innovation. He used examples from his own career to show how requirements are often written decades before a system is fielded, by which point both the technology and the threat environment have changed. In his telling, this creates a mismatch between what is bought and what is actually needed. The discussion repeatedly returned to the point that defense cannot continue writing rigid long-term requirements for dynamic technologies whose value depends on experimentation, feedback, and adaptation.
V. The System Over-Relies on Transactional Hand-Offs
Another central diagnosis was that the defense innovation pipeline remains too transactional. Foundational science is handled by one group, prototyping by another, requirements by another, and acquisition by yet another, often with little continuity across the process. Browning argued that this handoff model is one of the main reasons good technology dies before reaching the field. By the time a capability moves from one community to the next, momentum is lost, context is diluted, and no single actor is responsible for carrying it all the way to operational success.
VI. Iterative Development Must Replace the One-Time Perfect Solution Mindset
Browning strongly advocated for an iterative approach to defense development. Rather than expecting the first version of a capability to be final and perfect, he argued that the warfighter, developer, and acquirer must work together in continuous cycles of experimentation, feedback, and refinement. He described this bluntly as a process in which “the first one sucks,” and each subsequent version improves through operational use. The larger point was that the private sector already works this way, while the Department of Defense too often still tries to buy fully formed solutions before learning how they will actually be used.
VII. Experimentation and Testing Must Be Partners, Not Opposites
The discussion made an important distinction between experimentation and testing. Browning argued that experimentation is what reveals what a capability is useful for and how a warfighter wants to use it, while testing is what verifies that the final product performs reliably against known standards. He stressed that the Department of Defense has historically done more demonstration and formal testing than true operational experimentation. As a result, the system often tries to validate capabilities before it has actually learned how they should fit into combat operations.
VIII. Golden Dome Could Become the Model for Mission-Based Acquisition
A major thread in the conversation was whether Golden Dome could serve as the mechanism for breaking through existing service-by-service fragmentation. Browning argued that Golden Dome could succeed if it is empowered to operate as a truly joint, mission-first effort rather than another collection of separate service solutions. He described the need for a central command-and-control architecture with open interfaces, government-owned APIs, and an operating environment that allows new technologies, apps, software tools, and sensors to be integrated rapidly. In this model, Golden Dome would not just buy systems. It would create the open architecture that allows the best systems to plug in quickly.
IX. The United States Still Lacks a Truly Joint Procurement Culture
Browning emphasized that defense problems are increasingly domain-independent and joint, while the U.S. still largely buys solutions by service. He pointed to air and missile defense, counter-UAS, and long-range fires as examples of mission areas that now cut across Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force responsibilities. Yet procurement structures still divide them. The result is duplication, slower integration, and architectures that do not naturally fit together. The discussion treated this as one of the most serious structural barriers to modern integrated defense.
X. Three Core Reforms Emerged from the Discussion
Browning laid out three broad solutions. First, defense needs mission-based acquisition that starts with the operational problem rather than with service-specific programs. Second, it needs to break down the walls between different pots of money used for development, prototyping, and procurement, which currently reinforce delay and institutional fragmentation. Third, it needs a development culture based on constant interaction between developer and user, rather than one in which the warfighter states a need and then waits in isolation for years to see what arrives. Together, these reforms were presented as the heart of a more agile and combat-relevant defense acquisition system.
XI. Commercial Innovation Is Not the Problem. Transitioning It Is.
The discussion also focused heavily on how to bring Silicon Valley and commercial technology firms more effectively into the defense ecosystem. Browning argued that the main challenge is not that commercial firms lack relevant ideas. Rather, it is that the defense system has no efficient way to take a commercial capability that is 75 percent of the way there, adapt it, prototype it, and move it quickly into warfighter use. The missing piece is a transition mechanism: a central prototyping and integration environment that can turn promising commercial tools into operational capabilities without forcing vendors through years of rigid acquisition bureaucracy.
XII. Open Architecture and Vendor Lock Are Strategic Issues
Riki Ellison pressed Browning on the problem of proprietary data environments and vendor lock, especially in software-heavy command-and-control systems. Browning agreed that this is one of the defining issues in modern defense technology. He argued that the government must own the core architecture and data environment so that industry can compete to provide apps, tools, and AI agents without controlling the entire ecosystem. In his view, the United States needs a marketplace model in which the best technologies can be integrated and replaced rapidly, rather than a closed system in which one vendor controls the operating core and the rest of the field must conform to it.
XIII. AI, Data, and Software Require a New Business Model
The conversation emphasized that software and AI cannot be bought in the same way as traditional hardware. Browning noted that if DoD buys software in small quantities as though it were a static product, it fails to attract the best commercial talent. But if it relies on subscription models without safeguards, it risks vendor lock and loss of control. The discussion framed this as a major unresolved challenge: how to create a fiscal and architectural model that encourages the best commercial software and AI developers to work on defense problems while preserving government control, openness, and long-term flexibility.
XIV. The Technology Exists. The Challenge Is Integration and Adoption
When asked about lasers, electronic warfare, and space-based interceptors, Browning’s answer was direct: in many cases, the technology is feasible. The limiting factors are not purely technical. Instead, the barriers are policy, integration, cost, classification, acquisition design, and the lack of open systems that can absorb new capabilities quickly. His broader point was that the defense conversation too often focuses on whether a technology is possible, when the harder and more important question is whether the system is built to adopt and operationalize it.
XV. Security and Classification Are Also Slowing Innovation
Another important theme was that the defense community often classifies capabilities too early, which narrows who can work on them and slows maturation. Browning argued that there is a need for more open, unclassified environments where allies, industry, and innovators can experiment with new technologies before moving them into more secure operational settings. He also emphasized that cyber security must evolve toward a true zero-trust approach that allows rapid integration of outside systems and data sources without assuming those systems are fully trusted from the start.
XVI. The Future Fight Will Be Defined by Automation and Scale
In the closing exchange, Riki raised the growing problem of mass automated threats: thousands or even tens of thousands of low-cost drones and autonomous systems attacking at once. Browning argued that no single silver bullet will solve that problem. The answer will be layered, integrated defenses built on automation, rapid adaptation, and architectures that can absorb new technologies quickly. He stressed that the key is not merely finding one breakthrough weapon, but building a system that allows constant improvement, fast integration, and operational flexibility as the threat evolves.
XVII. Conclusion
The roundtable’s core conclusion was that the United States already has most of the technology it needs to compete and win in the next era of missile and drone defense. What it lacks is a system built to move that technology rapidly from idea to operator. The current acquisition and requirements structure remains too slow, too segmented, too rigid, and too service-bound for the realities of modern warfare. Browning’s central message was that mission-first acquisition, flexible funding, open architecture, iterative development, and joint integration are no longer optional reforms. They are now prerequisites for effective homeland defense, forward defense, and Golden Dome itself.
Speakers:
Mr. Thomas “Shotgun” Browning
The first-ever Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mission Capabilities, responsible for maintaining US technological superiority through the rapid transition of new technologies into military capabilities
Mr. Riki Ellison
MDAA Chairman and Founder
Q&A: Mr. Ron Christman
MDAA Director of Academic Programs, Studies, and Analysis