“Howdy and good afternoon from a wide-open space in probably one of the prettiest parts of our country. I’m in a cowboy ranch I grew up in here in Rimrock, Arizona. It’s where you dream big, you be big. It’s the American dream that we all, all of us, dream.
I’m Riki Ellison. I’m the chairman and founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance. We have been involved with Missile Defense for 40 years plus. We created MDAA 20 plus years ago. We are completely engaged with advocating and getting and doing everything we can as an organization to make our troops and our allies safe with missile defense, drone defense capabilities today. Our mission is making the world and our nation safer by the development and deployment of missile defense. And there’s, it’s just unbelievable the amount of desire, demand, demand, demand for this capabilities. And we’ve got to get much better at getting those to our war fighters around the world for this.
This is our 97th virtual that we’ve done. This is Breaking China. And we’re looking at this in numerous ways here, but obviously breaking China on a threat basis, on a movement that we’re seeing from them aggressively over the last 10 to 20 years, and their movement to change the world order. So this is, missile defense is part of that ability to break that and continue to keep the United States as the world leader.
This also is a discussion about breaking China, like a bull in a China store. We’ve been inundated with old China, our ability to change culture. We have to break China to change culture. And we’re seeing that. You’ve seen some of that that happened yesterday with the Secretary of the War as a result.
And the third thing is really detailing into base defense, base defense, the simplicity of that requirement, but the complexity of how to get that done. We still haven’t gotten that done. And that is a critical gap that has been exposed for our nation and for the world, but certainly our nation. And that’s that counter-UAS Shahed gap that we are challenged to do. And when you look at China, and you look at where they’re going with automation and with hundreds of thousands of drone warfare, that’s going to happen. That’s going to happen here. That we can no longer stay in how we’re doing this. And that autonomous command is something really real here for us to change and get into this fight, not get into the fight, but win the fight.
So these are some of the things we’re going to discuss today. We got to start off in the Pacific. We got to start off with what we as a nation have been doing to develop defensive capabilities against China in the Pacific, and then be able to take that, obviously, to where it needs to go over in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea, etc., to do that.”
—Riki Ellison, 97th MDAA Virtual CRT
Executive Summary
I. Introduction
The Virtual Congressional Roundtable “Breaking China” focused on the strategic, operational, and institutional challenges facing the United States in deterring and defeating the growing military threat posed by China, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Hosted by Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) Chairman Riki Ellison, the discussion featured Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jon “Ty” Thomas and Thomas “Shotgun” Browning. The conversation explored how the U.S. can counter China’s evolving capabilities—especially in drone warfare, long-range strike, and anti-access/area denial (A2AD)—while also addressing systemic shortcomings in defense acquisition, integration, and base defense. The central conclusion was that while the United States possesses the necessary technology, it lacks the speed, integration, and organizational alignment required to effectively deploy it at scale.
II. Strategic Context: Deterrence and the China Challenge
The discussion framed “breaking China” in multiple dimensions: deterring aggression, defeating Chinese forces if conflict occurs, and overcoming internal U.S. institutional barriers. China’s strategy centers on keeping U.S. forces at distance through long-range kill chains and A2AD capabilities. The U.S. must counter this by denying China the ability to detect, track, and target American forces, thereby undermining the credibility of its strategy. At the same time, China is rapidly learning from ongoing conflicts and is expected to exploit gaps in U.S. defenses, particularly through mass and automation.
III. Base Defense and the Underlayer Gap
A central concern throughout the discussion was the vulnerability of U.S. bases, especially in maritime-dominated theaters like the Indo-Pacific. Participants emphasized that current defenses lack sufficient “underlayer” capabilities to counter low-cost threats such as drones and cruise missiles. The inability to detect and engage threats over water before they reach land creates a significant disadvantage. Despite clear lessons from Ukraine and the Middle East, the U.S. has been slow to adopt scalable, low-cost sensing and defense solutions, leaving critical gaps in base protection.
IV. Artemis Program: A Model for Innovation
Lt. Gen. Thomas highlighted the Artemis program, a collaboration between MDAA and the University of Hawaii, as a promising model for rapid, low-cost innovation. The program emphasizes three principles: no-classification data sharing, affordability, and rapid fielding.
Three key projects emerged:
APEX: A distributed acoustic sensing network capable of detecting hypersonic and other threats using low-cost sensors deployed across maritime and aerial platforms.
Makahiki: A constellation of small satellites providing multi-sensor data collection through commercially available technologies.
ARGUS: A shared data environment enabling allies and partners to contribute and access unclassified sensor data.
Together, these initiatives demonstrate how academic partnerships and open architectures can accelerate capability development and improve situational awareness across the Indo-Pacific.
V. The Fragmentation of Defense Systems
A recurring theme was the fragmented nature of U.S. defense systems. Each military service develops and operates its own capabilities, resulting in duplication, inefficiency, and poor integration. In practice, this leads to disconnected sensing and engagement systems, limiting the ability to respond effectively to coordinated or mass attacks. The current approach—attempting to integrate systems during conflict—is inadequate for modern warfare, where speed and coordination are critical.
VI. Joint Acquisition and Integrated Architecture
Browning emphasized the need to move beyond “joint interoperability” toward true joint acquisition. Instead of connecting separate systems after the fact, the Department of Defense should develop unified architectures from the outset. This includes integrated command-and-control systems that allow all domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyber—to operate from a common picture. Such an approach would enable more efficient allocation of resources and prevent redundant or misdirected engagements.
VII. Countering China’s Kill Chains
To effectively counter China, the U.S. must focus on disrupting its kill chains rather than solely relying on defensive systems. This includes targeting the full spectrum of Chinese capabilities: sensing, communication, navigation, and weapon guidance. Non-kinetic tools such as cyber and electronic warfare were highlighted as critical components in degrading China’s ability to execute long-range strikes. The goal is to create uncertainty and reduce the effectiveness of Chinese targeting systems.
VIII. The Importance of Resilience and Reconstitution
Participants stressed that future conflict with China will likely involve significant initial disruption. Victory will depend not on avoiding damage, but on the ability to recover quickly. This requires resilient and “reconstitutable” systems—capabilities that can be rapidly restored or replaced after being degraded. Distributed architectures, commercial technologies, and agile manufacturing were identified as key enablers of this resilience.
IX. Drone Warfare and the Challenge of Mass
The rise of mass drone warfare presents a fundamental challenge for U.S. defenses. While the U.S. excels at countering individual high-end threats, it struggles to defend against large-scale, low-cost attacks that overwhelm systems through sheer volume. Addressing this requires a shift from point defense to broader, coordinated approaches that integrate sensing, decision-making, and engagement across large geographic areas. However, participants also noted challenges in sustaining drone inventories, including rapid obsolescence and the need for flexible production rather than large stockpiles.
X. Acquisition Failures and the Need for Reform
The discussion repeatedly returned to the shortcomings of the defense acquisition system. Promising technologies—such as those demonstrated in Ukraine—are not being adopted or scaled quickly enough. Bureaucratic processes, funding silos, and lack of prioritization slow the transition from innovation to fielding. While initiatives like the LUCAS program demonstrate that rapid prototyping and fielding are possible, they remain exceptions rather than the norm.
XI. The Role of Experimentation and Prototyping
A key solution identified was expanding joint prototyping and experimentation. By rapidly testing new technologies in operational environments, the Department of Defense can identify effective solutions and build support for scaling them. Participants called for a more robust, joint prototyping organization capable of integrating ideas from industry, academia, and government and moving them quickly into the field.
XII. Allies, Partnerships, and Data Sharing
The importance of allies and partners was emphasized throughout the discussion. Programs like Artemis demonstrate the value of shared, unclassified data environments that enable collaboration across nations. Leveraging allied capabilities not only enhances overall effectiveness but also increases resilience and scalability in the face of distributed threats.
XIII. Cultural and Organizational Barriers
Beyond technical and procedural issues, the discussion highlighted deeper cultural challenges within the U.S. defense establishment. A lack of urgency, institutional inertia, and risk aversion have hindered progress in areas like base defense and counter-drone capabilities. Overcoming these barriers will require a shift in mindset toward faster decision-making, greater experimentation, and acceptance of initial imperfection in deployed systems.
XIV. Conclusion
The roundtable concluded that the United States has the technological foundation needed to counter China’s military strategy, but is constrained by systemic inefficiencies and cultural barriers. Success will depend on the ability to rapidly integrate and field capabilities, adopt joint and mission-focused approaches, and build resilient systems that can withstand and recover from initial attacks. Ultimately, “breaking China” requires not only countering an external adversary, but also transforming the internal processes and culture that limit the effectiveness of U.S. defense innovation.
Speakers:
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Jon Thomas
Former Deputy Commander, Pacific Air Forces; MDAA Board Member
Mr. Thomas “Shotgun” Browning
The first-ever Assistant Secretary of Defense for Mission Capabilities, responsible for maintaining US technological superiority through the rapid transition of new technologies into military capabilities
Mr. Riki Ellison
MDAA Chairman and Founder