

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Welcome. I am Riki Ellison, hosting this event from the home of the Northern Command, NORTHCOM, here in Colorado Springs. That command is to defend North America and the US homeland. Ladies and gentlemen, our hearts, our empathy, our sympathy, our feelings, the travesty of what has happened with over 1000 lives lost in Israel, 25 of them American, we stand behind Israel.

I've been involved with missile defense for 40 years, starting with Edward Teller lectures and did form MDAA 20 years ago when we formed NORTHCOM, formed MDAA. Over those 40 years, going all the way back to the Strategic Defense Initiative, where one of the greatest achievements of the Strategic Defense Initiative was the MOU with Israel to create missile defense capabilities. We've been part of that. We've seen our Patriots go over there and defend Israel in combat in the Gulf Wars. We've been over there with the development of the Green Pine radar with Arrow 1, Arrow 2, Arrow 3, with the Iron Dome. We were big advocates of the Iron Dome in 2011, as they moved that forward. We visited the TYP 2 Radar site that's just south of Gaza. We have been there last year with their soldiers manning Iron Dome batteries in the defense of their country.

Israel and every homeland has to have defensive capability. I would say all layers, but even the greatest country in intelligence maybe in the world got surprised. And it was fortunate that Israel, though it wasn't perfect, had capabilities that saved maybe thousands of lives that would've been dead if they didn't have those capabilities. And I think we all saw those Iron Dome rockets. It is critical for that to happen. What we've seen is a challenge and a direct attack on World Order. It is a challenge and a direct attack on deterrence.

Regional deterrence has failed just like it did in Ukraine. And it may fail in Taiwan. It failed in Israel. Whether you can say it's sanctions or incentives or appeasement or military offense, it failed. And deterrence, as I was taught by General John Hyten and most of our STRATCOM commanders, you have to be able to impose cost and they have to believe that you can impose cost and you have to be able to defend and deny their cost on you. And then you have to have the political will to do that.

We have seen our president, President Joe Biden, who has put one of our biggest offensive platforms in the world, the carrier group Ford with Aegis BMD ships in the Gulf, I'm sorry, in the Mediterranean. We've seen this. We've seen our ability, our capabilities we can give to Israel because it's bigger than just Israel. Our allies are watching, our enemies are watching and perhaps supporting the other side because it's a challenge to World Order. And we have two Iron Domes here in this country that should be in Israel today. We have THAAD and Patriot batteries ready to get on a plane in Texas that could fly over there in a heartbeat. We have an EPAA around Europe to defend Europe from Iran should this escalate. We have four BMD ships in Rota, Spain.

We are prepared to defend. This is a watershed moment for Israel and I think for the world. So today we can't express it the way Tal Inbar, our MDAA fellow, can. He is in Israel today. He's

from Israel, he's been there. He's the expert in the world on rockets from Iran, rockets from Hezbollah, rockets from Hamas, from North Korea. He's an expert, a world expert. Ladies and gentlemen, from Israel, Tal Inbar.

Mr. Tal Inbar:

Thank you, Riki, for the words and the kind support, as always. Just this morning there was a siren here where I live, which is not so common. I'm about 30 kilometers north of Tel Aviv. A fragment from a rocket—after the interception by Iron Dome—landed just several meters from my house. So it was an awakening call for this morning, firsthand.

So we saw at the beginning of this unbelievable large-scale savage attack the firing of several thousands of rockets in a timeframe of several hours. This was just a diversion from the ground attack on the first day last Saturday. The range—not only the quantities—but the range of the rockets was larger than ever before for Hamas rockets, with at least one rocket traveling from the Gaza Strip up to Haifa in the north of Israel. Most of the rockets were intercepted successfully by Iron Dome. But as all of us know too well, there is no such a thing as 100% proof; any missile defense system is not hermetic.

We had several casualties in various regions all across Israel, and we saw some firing of rockets from the north as well. During the last days, we saw a minimum, at least for now, use of small UAVs from the Gaza Strip. There was perhaps something in the north that was traveling yesterday and today, and it was not intercepted. In the north there was a use of Patriot missiles, which are another layer, although obsolete regarding to other systems that we are using. But nevertheless, we saw an operational firing of those missiles as well. So we see huge quantities of rockets and the first use in this conflict of small UAVs.

We have to remember that we have Hezbollah on the north, so we are on very high alert on the ground in terms of missile defense, of course. Hezbollah is another story. And of course, what Riki said before is absolutely correct. Hezbollah is a proxy of Iran ideologically and, of course, Iran supports all of these capabilities in terms of weapons, rockets and so on. But Hezbollah has several assets that Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza lacks. For example, actual cruise missiles made in Iran, more capable UAVs, not just crude and rudimentary vehicles like we saw before, even in 2021 from Gaza. And of course several types of actual missiles, which are much more accurate. So this was one of the reasons to develop another layer of defense in Israel, David Sling.

We have to keep one eye on the north, two eyes on the south and be prepared for more surprises to come. This is not yet a two fronts war or a conflict, but we have to be prepared for this. On the first day, on Saturday, I read in several social media accounts related to the Houthis in Yemen that they are preparing to take part in these attacks against Israel. Just recently in Yemen, there was a military parade. For the first time we saw without disguise, without any attempt to hide the source, we saw long range, almost 2000 kilometers range ballistic missiles provided by Iran to the Houthis. So technically speaking, they have the capabilities of launching several attacks on our country. So for that, we are prepared with the air missiles.

As you can see on the news and social media, the situation here is very complex, let alone the horrific price in loss of human lives and all the people that were kidnapped. This is something else. We are focusing in this event on missile defense. But, we are prepared. There is no such thing as too much defense, and we are in constant need of more interceptors, more batteries. So any long duration conflict is another challenge for the defensive side. Those are just some preliminary remarks that I wanted to share. During this conversation we will have some more insights and comments on other people's questions or remarks.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Thank you. Thank you, Tal. I'd like to ask a question or two for you. Obviously we have not seen a military reaction by Israel to this. And with that you are rightfully stating that they're going to have to defend against all sorts of missile threats from all sorts of places. And you have rightfully said, you have systems today that are capable of that. I'd like to question the integration of everything because it looked like there may have been something that went wrong with the counter UAVs in the beginning to dismantle some of the stuff that Israel had at Gaza Strip. Where was that counter UAV defensive capabilities and are we fully integrated across, and if not, obviously the rush to do it? Secondly, what ammunition do you need specifically—or do you need more systems—from both from the United States and from other allies that would want to contribute to this?

Mr. Tal Inbar:

I would like to first refer to the counter UAV system. We saw first, Israel was caught by surprise. It was not only a strategic surprise, it was an operational surprise, a situational one. On the first wave of attacking our country, Hamas used—for the first time—small drones with small bomblets like we see in Ukraine for years. They were able to destroy, I think, if not all, most of the observation cameras and some systems that are connected to them. So it was a big surprise. The end result is such that you can understand that counter drones capabilities were not incorporated into the defense of the southern border. So of course, this is one operational lesson that is clear. Counter drones capabilities varies from jamming the communication or the GNSS signals, be it GPS, laser, and other means of hard defense. So, obviously, this was not the correct way to defend or apply some sort of defense to the observation capabilities. And this must be addressed. We have the capabilities. So this will be, of course, mitigated in the future. And I can speculate, rightfully, that it is already taken into account in the northern arena.

Regarding help or support from other countries, as you know, Riki, we have a full integration with all the US communication protocols. We have a lot of combined military drills with the US, bringing here some missile defenses, and batteries, and troops, and so on. So in that regard, let's say, for example—I don't want to see it happening, because if it will, it would be a very, very severe scenario—but 80 ships could also take an integral part of defending our country. And, of course, they have the capabilities, and know-how, and all the connectivity with Israeli systems were tested before. So this is one issue.

And the other issue is, by sending US aircraft carriers and all the force with it, this is a clear sign of deterrence to other parties not to interfere. Like we heard from President Biden, when he said it directly to Iran, Hezbollah, and other parties in the region. So we are capable, of course, to defend ourself, but any help from friends will be always appreciated.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Thank you, Tal. Well done. Ladies and gentlemen, our next speaker, a phenomenal diplomat, phenomenal statesman. Been involved with our highest offices in the State Department, Department of Defense Policy or State Policy over several administrations. We have the luxury of hearing his strategic viewpoints on deterrence, and on this situation and the ramifications of this, and its complexity, that this world's going to have to play to be able to settle this. Ladies and gentlemen, John Rood.

Mr. John Rood:

Well, thank you, Riki, for that wonderful introduction. You're too generous as usual. I will say in starting with expressing our concern from the United States about what's going on, and sympathy and solidarity with our friends and allies in Israel. It is an unprecedented time. It is a remarkable thing that's occurred that, frankly, hasn't occurred in decades. It's interesting to me that Hamas chose the anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur war, attack on Israel from many sides by combined Arab armies on a Jewish holiday, to do it again, albeit differently. This is a different kind of attack. But the brutality and the scale of it, just a reminder of the kind of threats that our friends in Israel face on a regular basis. And it's incumbent on us in the United States to recognize the severity of this moment. And to make sure that we're doing all that we can to stand with our close friends and allies.

And there are so many personal ties that we all have with our friends in Israel and so many family relationships. I'm actually a little bit surprised that the number of Americans killed, which is tragic, roughly 25, and who knows exactly how many hostages, but the numbers I saw quoted yesterday were 17 Americans missing and presumed either dead or taken hostage. I'm actually surprised it's not a larger number, given the amount of people to people ties we have with the Israelis from the United States.

But understanding the significance of the event. And one of the things that I think is a casualty of the type of reporting in the media that we see in the United States is that the underlying causes of the conflict, I think, are sometimes glossed over. Or it's somehow just uncomfortable to say this is a conflict driven by religion, a conflict driven by a desire to eradicate the state of Israel by Hamas or other opponents. But I think it bears a quick reminder that that's at the root cause of this conflict. And if you put it in context, we didn't get to this moment because of some planning that occurred in the last month or two.

This has been a continuum, where Iran, and what it describes as its Axis of Resistance, has been funding and training groups all the way from the Mediterranean Sea, through to the Gulf. Whether it's Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, in the West Bank, supporting other

resistance groups which go by a variety of names. Supporting militants in Syria, where there's been essentially a low grade war underway, sometimes a hot grade war, between the Israelis and Iranian proxy forces now for many years. And then, continuing, whether that's in Jordan or in Iraq, where there's a series of militias that the Iranian revolutionary guard has funded, trained and, at times, they are on site to support. It was not an accident that, as an example, when the previous head of the IRGC, General Soleimani, was visiting his proxy forces in Iraq is when the United States chose to remove him from the battlefield and kill him because of that support.

These folks have planned these militias attacks, not only to create an Axis of Resistance around Israel, but to promote Iran's influence more broadly. And that has meant, over the years, attacks on American forces. When I served in the Pentagon, as an example, we attributed over 600 US soldiers being killed to the actions of these various Iranian backed militias. And that extends to attacks in Saudi Arabia and the UAE by the Houthis, who Tal mentioned earlier. And they are fueled by an animus, driven by religion, and a hatred of Israel, and the United States, by the way. They sing and chant death to Israel, but they also chant death to America for the same kinds of reasons. And that's where there's a strong US interest in standing with our friends and allies in Israel against that kind of ideology. To also say we simply cannot accept this kind of terrorism in the name of what they say are different ideals politically. But, also, we have an interest in supporting democracy. We have an interest in supporting the growth of our ideals from such a close friend and ally in Israel.

I do think President Biden has put forward US support and solidarity. I would like to see us, in the United States, be willing to do more. Because, again, this Axis of Resistance, it's possible that, as horrific and large scale as this attack has been, the conflict could grow to be much broader. And the reason is, since the attacks on October 9th, you've seen attacks from Lebanon by Hezbollah and affiliated militias into Israel, using rockets and other means, and small arms fire, and artillery, firings, anti-tank missiles. You've seen in the West Bank, Iranian backed militias also trying to create another front. Or, as a minimum, keep, through feints, Israeli forces preoccupied with protecting things on their eastern side of the country. In Syria, you've seen launches and attacks from Iranian affiliated militias into Israel, using rockets and other means, again, to create another front.

And then, as Tal mentioned, other militias in Iraq and Yemen threatening this. And there's a large number of these. And, again, this is not where traditional US media focuses on, but they're not hiding it. It's just generally covered in foreign media. So, for instance, the top leadership of the Iranian backed militias in Iraq, and they go by a variety of names like Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Ashab al-Kahf, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and so on, the Badr Organization, have all publicly affiliated themselves with the Hamas war with Israel. Threatened to strike Israeli or American targets should the United States intervene. And you could go on and on. And the Iranian government hides behind the thinnest of fig leaves in terms of their support for these organizations because they do support what they believe they've created, this so-called Axis of Resistance.

So that's the strategic level. And we've been building up to that for some time. The 2006 war in Lebanon against Israel by Hezbollah has continued on a continuum, just in different forms. And

that's the conflict that I see going on in Syria. And that's the conflict I think we've seen throughout the Gulf. And proxy forces holding each other at risk throughout that geography. So I'd like to see us, in the United States, do some more, is that we do have capabilities, such as some Iron Dome batteries that we purchased from Israel. I think those should be prepared and be ready. Depending on the volume of fire, it may be something where the US can offer to the Israeli government to not only transfer those, but to man them with American soldiers in Israel as a sign of solidarity.

The same thing, depending on the level, if the conflict should escalate and the volume of fire is hard to appreciate. But when you really go through the simulations, and you look at the volume of fire that could be produced by Hezbollah and other affiliated militias, as strong as the Israeli defense is, and they've done a marvelous job creating a multi-layered defense, this is an area where the United States needs stand ready. And have forces on alert that we could offer. And then, I think, as Tal mentioned, the other thing I would like to see the US continue to do is position our forces in a way that send a deterrent message, to try to keep it harm, and keep out of the conflict these other members of the so-called Axis of Resistance.

Moving a carrier battle group is good. I, personally, would love to have seen an amphibious ready group, which provides a marine air ground task force, moved in position off the coast of Lebanon, to send a signal about what that force could do. Which has more capabilities, in some ways, that are applicable to a conflict like this. And I'd like to see us be willing, where we need to, to augment Israel's defenses. There's a fine line there, which is the Israelis need to maintain deterrence. They need to restore deterrence. And they need to show that they can handle the defense on their own. But on the other hand, sending a strategic message to all the others that if they think they can bring additional force to bear, that the United States can augment the Israeli forces in a way that would be meaningful strategically.

You are seeing the effects of the buildup of these more advanced missiles and capabilities that, both in volume, sophistication, and accuracy, this is where there's always a race between the offense and defense. And I can't help but point out some of these myths about the cost effectiveness of defenses. And, unfortunately, this still persists in some quarters of the United States, this argument that the defense costs more than the offense. That we can't keep up on the cost equation by firing missile defenses against incoming missiles. I think the conflict in Israel shows the opposite to be true. If the Israelis had not invested in the size and scale of the defense that they had, which, admittedly, as Tal pointed out, cannot do 100%, cannot hermetically protect the country like an astrodome. But, nonetheless, saves lives and allows options for other parts of the conflict to come into play.

This is a case study that the opponents of missile defense need, frankly, some remedial education and understanding. And as you mentioned, Riki, it could very well expand much more broadly. There has been heavy use of drones, rockets, missiles. But we could see a dramatic expansion of that. Because since the 2006 war, where you saw heavy, heavy use of these systems by Hezbollah, Hezbollah, unfortunately, has a much larger arsenal and the surrounding militias. So I think, unfortunately, this is going to be something we're all going to have to deal

with in the short run. So that's probably enough from me. But, again, just a remarkable time, and a time when we, in the United States, need to stand with our friends in Israel.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

John, that was brilliant. Thank you for your analysis. Assuming, I shouldn't say assuming, that Israel now has a military consequence, pretty significant, and that may be all the way back into Iran, how do you deescalate this thing? Is there statement shift going on and what's that? Because it could easily go big once Israel makes its first move on this. That's why I would assume that Secretary of State's in Israel right now. But help us, from your perspective, to deescalate this potential world war happening.

Mr. John Rood:

I think, clearly, the Israelis need to restore deterrence. But too often that gets translated, I think, into American ways of thinking about a conflict that if... How many people are killed of the opponent? Did the opponent do something barbaric that the rest of the world looks poorly on? It doesn't get as much reporting as it should, but the psychology of this, the people that came to kill babies, to rape women, to mutilate bodies, they were not shunned by their compatriots in Gaza. They were celebrated. You look at the imagery there, there aren't voices in that society condemning killing children and others. And so part of restoring deterrence is an honor-shame calculation that does Hamas, have they won a strategic victory by delivering a blow against their enemies? Or have they been, in a way, that the Israelis shown enough strength that Hamas has experienced some loss?

And that's where the future of this conflict will get decided. And I know that sounds very airy-fairy and not military measures of merit the way we would calculate that in the United States, but you have to translate to the people that you're deterring, the people and the society.

And depending on how the future chapters unfold here with other chapters in this war, that's a similar calculation. You have to convey to Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah that should you enter the conflict, might you be reversed, might you experience a defeat that therefore lowers your standing. So it's best to stay out of the war, my friend, is kind of the message you want to convey.

And so I think tough decisions ahead for the leadership in Israel about the nature of the response in Gaza. Because having visited one of these terror tunnels in this case in the north, when you see the scale of them and how long it took by hand through hard rock, one at a time in cramped, very hot conditions, you truly have to hate someone else to go through that level of effort in order to simply kill one or two or five civilians, which is what occurred in some of these other tunnel attacks.

And if you understand that psychology and what it takes to deter it and what it takes to prevent further attacks like this, there's the military technical means, but there's a psychology that unfortunately I think it's very little reporting in the United States.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Thank you, John. That was brilliant. As the title of our virtual today is Integrating Offense with Defense, we have a great speaker, Deputy Head of Ops for the US Air Force just retired Charles Corky Corcoran is his name. He's done numerous exercises and flights with the Israeli Air Force and is very versed on Air Force operations and to look at the combination if Israel does an attack, we're looking now at defending the maneuvering forces, whether it's on ground or on sea or on land. You're adding that component in addition to the defensive of the civilians. So ladies and gentlemen, Charles Corcoran.

Maj Gen (Ret.) Charles "Corky" Corcoran:

Thank you for the kind intro, Riki. Let me begin by echoing the sentiments that both you and John passed to Tal. Tal to you and your country mates and to, really to all the families, families around the world from several nations who lost loved ones in this brutal and unprovoked attack. My sympathies are with you going forward.

John just mentioned it in his comments, Riki, this is a case study in why we need missile defense. And so like you talked about the title of our presentation, I guess I can walk through prior to October 7th and then what it looks like going forward from my perspective. If you look at missile defense, we talk about from one end of the spectrum is you deter, and then you go into passive defense, train their population and hardening things into active defense where you have sensors, C2 and effectors that can shoot down incoming missiles across all different levels from the rockets and mortars we see all the way up to the exo atmospheric region.

And then finally you get to, if they keep shooting at you, you want to get after attack ops, you want to take out the archer. So if we look at this where we were prior to this vicious attack on 7 October, deterrence was the name of the game, passive defense was the name of the game. There were some active defense cases here and there where rockets would come at various places in Israel utilizing the Iron Dome to take out those and a heavy reliance on basically a strong set of network sensors to cover all the various threats that surround Israel.

And then there were some limited attack ops, quite frankly, to reinforce that, "Hey, if you do this, you're going to get poked. This matters. Cut it out." Whether it was for interdiction or whether it was to take out rocket launchers in Gaza, et cetera.

And as you said earlier, Riki, on 7 October, all that changed. Deterrence, that mindset that the nation of Israel was in clearly failed. It clearly failed. So moving forward from there, what we saw was a tremendous response by the Israeli Defense forces, passive and active defense primarily from the Iron ... well, exclusively basically from the Iron Dome at that point. I think we've seen 4,500 rockets, 4,500 plus rockets fired from the start of this conflict, including 3,000 on that first day. And the sensors and the command and control structure did their job for the most part, not 100%, but are really, really very effective. The training of the Israeli citizenry did their job, and the rocket attacks didn't cause nearly as much damage as they could have had that missile defense structure not been in place.

Now what's interesting, I think this will be looked at in the future, but I think Tal said it earlier. The rockets may have largely been a distraction because what they also did while firing those rockets, they're flying over small UASs with explosives on them and taking out observation posts all around Gaza. They had fan or turbine powered hang gliders flying folks across the fence.

And it'll be interesting to go back and see did the sensors see those and just not report them? Did they think there were rockets that were going to hit somewhere? But why was that information not fed back through the chain of command and those things dealt with? So there are obviously some things to debrief and fix going forward there.

But then, what we've also seen, which is exactly what you'd expect when deterrence failed, is a tremendous increase in the attack ops piece of this. We've got to go out there and take out the archer, if you will.

Israel is doing the best job they can with the equipment they have F-35s, F-15s, F-16s, using the intelligence they have, the extensive intelligence network and the sensors they have to go in there and find where the other side sensors are, where their command and control facilities are, where their launches are, and take out any and every one of those things that they can.

Oh, by the way, the higher tier, the David Sling and the Arrow on high alert and the messaging is happening to all those folks around the region that John talked about, that you better stay in your lane, don't come in here and escalate this. So we're at a new level of how to deter further escalation, which is a discussion you and John just had.

The next step in this I think for Israel as you're going to see is a potential combined arms offensive into the Gaza Strip and we'll see if that happens and how it plays out, but that's what we've heard the Prime Minister talking about. Hamas must be eradicated. And it's really for all the reasons John just said. This is, I hate to exaggerate, but maybe I'm not, it's a clash of civilizations. If people like this are not going to want to be part of the western world, the civilized world, then you've got to do something about it.

And this is where I think reestablishing deterrence going forward, it's got to be an aligned western world. So right now our Secretary of Defense and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are in Brussels for what was supposed to be a meeting to discuss support for Ukraine, Ukraine contact group. And it's been encouraging to see the NATO members come together there and express their unwavering support for Israel. That has got to stand and it's got to stand not just to talk to Hamas, but to all the other actors that John mentioned and probably a couple that I don't know if John did mention. Russia and China are watching too, as is North Korea. So there's got to be a really strong coordinated response, not just Israeli but Western response to this.

Now going forward, if that combined arms all domain effort happens, then Israel is in a really good position because of the work they have done to organize training to equip themselves and the work that the US has done to support that. So what you'll see is a continued work along the

spectrum of missile defense, both passive, active, and attack ops, but now you'll see combined in there offensive operations that is going to be very well coordinated through their high end C2 network to ensure that the operations going on across all domains, land, air, and even from the sea to get after Hamas don't impact the ability of Israel to defend themselves from rockets or anything else coming out of that area.

And oh, by the way, again, still looking north and east to threats there and making sure you're ready to respond to this. I'll stop there, Riki. Thank you.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Corky, in that thought process, the lessons learned here from Israel in this situation is still moving through that, but do those lessons apply to Ukraine and the current fight, or is Ukraine ahead of this or behind this? And do those lessons equate to something that may happen in Taiwan that we can be better prepared for, or is this just a separate entity with a terrorist group to deal with? Can you explain about that-

Maj Gen (Ret.) Charles "Corky" Corcoran:

Yeah, Riki, I'll say, I don't think there's any conflict in the history of man that you can't learn something from. So there's absolutely learning to be had, absolutely. And I think a lot of that's going on right now, not only in our military, but western militaries. And oh, by the way, in the adversaries. The adversaries are looking at what they can do better to have even more of, I don't want to call it success, but to better achieve the goals they were trying to achieve.

So yeah, we need to learn from this. We need to apply the lessons learned. And again, the big one is deterrence failed. Deterrence failed. And we've got a lot of bad actors out there that are looking to do bad things or to continue to do bad things, and we've got to figure out how to reestablish deterrence, and if not, be ready to strike.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Thank you. Thank you Corky.

Ladies and gentlemen, our next speaker was Deputy Ops at EUCOM at some point when Israel was part of EUCOM. It's now part of CENTCOM. Obviously Mark's familiar with the carrier fleet and the power that it possesses, and certainly Mark's been one of the great advocates for Iron Dome for Israel over the years that he's been in a position to do that. So ladies and gentlemen, retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

Thanks, Riki. Look, I'll pick up the ... I think Tal and John and Corky covered a lot of ground there. What I'll do is just talk a little bit about what I think we need to provide, and this will backtrack on some of the things that I think John mentioned.

I will start upfront and say Israel does not want the US or any other country, their forces fighting for Israel. Israel's been strong on that, and I just think they're going to stick to that. I don't see that happening except as part of a much broader Middle East War. So I am careful when I say that, but I don't think they want US troops.

On the other hand, I do like John's idea of giving them the two Iron Dome batteries and the associated Tamir missiles. I imagine we've done some modifications. We're going to have to quickly get those done. It is rocket science, but it's not rocket science. I think we can get this stuff delivered to them pretty rapidly. They're probably going to need it. They're bringing up reservists. I think they can man it without our people, and certainly the Tamir rounds, that would be helpful.

Second is, obviously we're pushing hard on precision guided munition, small diameter bombs. It's what we need in an urban environment. It's what we've used. Sadly, like every other munition in the US inventory, especially all the air defense ones we've talked about, small diameter bombs have been on a decline over the last five years in our production from a peak of maybe 10,000 or so a year back in FY '15, '16, '17. I want to say last year's order was 1500. This year the administration was ... Or this year's order and the budget that they're working through right now, I think they were tagging about 800. My guess is that number has a pencil eraser being applied to it right now and a much higher number put on it because we're going to have to give from our inventory, we're going to have to accelerate the Israeli buy that was going on, probably allow them to pull from our spot in the line and get those going. And there's some other spots.

The good news here is it doesn't conflict with the ground launch small diameter bomb we're giving to Ukraine. It's a slightly different line. You modify the winglets and everything differently. So this isn't going to ... Anyone who starts to say, "Oh, this is going to make Ukraine got us in trouble here." It did not. This is a separate issue. So get them the small diameter bombs.

Then the other thing is we're going to need a supplemental. We have a \$3.9 billion FMF package each year to Israel as part of a 10-year deal. 3.4 billion of that is straight FMF. 500 million is missile defense for Iron Dome David's Sling Arrow war.

That 3.9 is locked tight. That number is not going to change. However, there is a codicil that if there's combat expenditure of missile defense equipment, they can come back to us for more, and so that needs the basis of a supplemental. I think if I were running things in Congress, I'd have a beleaguer democracy supplemental where I'd throw whatever amount we decide on Tamirs and small diameter bombs for Israel, maybe a billion dollars, a couple billion dollars, the Ukraine package, and a couple billion in Taiwan stuff. That's Taiwan supplemental that's been floated in the Senate. Put them together and say Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan: three countries under threat from authoritarian regimes, and with Israel, I'd say Iran, but broadly other things, Ukraine, Russia and Taiwan, China. I'd get them there. I'd be pushing that now.

I do want to comment on the two carrier strike groups. They're fantastic signaling, but they are not actually, as John kind of referred to, the necessary combat forces. Each one has four to six Aegis-equipped ships, probably a total of seven ballistic missile defense ships in there.

Now, I'd break this out. We're not going to be shooting down crossing-shot rockets out of Gaza, or very unlikely out of Lebanon from Hezbollah into Israel. However, these are very good for shooting down IRBMs from China. Israel again, has a capability to Arrow 3. By having these there in station ready to go in a high altitude de-confliction program that we run with the Israelis, there is no capacity shortfall. And so close it nicely, and I think that is a value. The rest of it is symbolic. The ballistic missile defense ships, and not all of them, you put them up in rotations because there is a cruise missile threat from Hezbollah there, but I'd have them in there.

One other thing I want to say, Riki, is let's not forget - Iran is 100% responsible for this event. Iran resources Hamas to 95% of their resources, \$100 million a year over the last seven years. They train them. I don't know whether they gave the go signal or not. I really don't care. If you train someone and you resource someone, you are accountable. You own what they did, and Iran owns this. And Israel's smart. They're putting a pin in it.

They'll take care of other business first, but at some point, Iran needs to be held accountable by Israel and the United States for this action. And look, to be clear, Iran is the beneficiary of this. Israel and Saudi Arabia are getting very close to each other. That normalization, the completion of the Abraham Accords that happened under John's watch, John Rood's watch, was about to get the real prize - Saudi Arabia. The one country... Like, Saudi Arabia doesn't care about Lebanon. They're not required to. They do have to care about Palestinians as part of their ownership of the faith and, as a result, they now have to stand back. It also squirms the mending of the relationships between Saudi Arabia and the United States. So they were the beneficiary.

I'm not a hundred percent sure why the United States is playing coy about this. Iran is accountable. They're going to be held. I think eventually we'll find a smoking gun where they're really, really accountable, but they did this.

And so, Riki, I think when you think about long-term missile defense issues, when we handle that issue months or a year from now, now there's another, there's a different type of ballistic missile challenge.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Okay. Mark, two questions for you on that. As you stated, the pin is going to be put on the donkey and most likely, good odds, that they're going to be a limited strike on Iran possibly. And now I'm going to go back to before Israel had Arrow 3, we had to have our BMD ships off the coast to defend that type of threat coming at that. But that seems to be that we got that many ships plus the four ships.

Then the second question I have, where was their overhead persistent sensor in Gaza? Was it DEW up? Where was that to see everything? Why would you not have that over the Gaza Strip? I think there's limited, they might've been up north, but having an overhead persistent sensor would've solved a lot of these problems.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

So look, two thoughts. The first, Arrow 3 has been at the right... I believe Israel has reasonably paced the Iranian IRBM capability at the same time as they've evolved through Arrow up, Arrow 3. All I'm talking about with the US is capacity. I just think we help with that. We take pressure off that kind of system. I think that's useful. Again, that's a minor player right now. Could be a major player later.

On the issue of this, just randomly six months ago I was down in Gaza in one of the kibbutz. In fact, the kibbutz that was really hit the worst. I spent a day there and I looked at the security. I was on the wall, looked at the depth, my untrained eye, it looked like a lot of security. There's a lot of surveillance, a lot of tipper to allow the movement of forces.

So when you look at this, it's a dual failure. There's a strategic failure by the United States and Israel. However, we were monitoring communication big picture between Iran and these groups among themselves. Clearly they found a data stream that we're not listening to properly, and we'll have to find out what that is and re-get it. That's not the first time that's happened to us, but that strategic one's up here.

Probably the tactical one is, I won't call complacency, but it's a failure in creativity. They built the system around coming outside of Gaza towards the Israeli communities down there. And I think over time there was a belief that through the automation and the putting the surveillance systems in, remotely operated weapons, response times to the police and Army, there became a hole that a fastidious adversary studying daily was able to find and that's just one of those things you have to go back. And it's unfortunate when you have a strategic and a tactical failure simultaneously, you can get an egregious event like this.

I don't want to overplay it. The US is part of that strategic failure. We work very closely with our Israeli partners in listening to things so we missed it, too. But I will tell you, we got to redouble our efforts on this and then we have to watch, look at what's up at Golan because the Israelis are all over the Golan now, they've kicked the Druze families out, what we have for tactical warning in Lebanon on the Lebanese border and in Ramallah, I mean, excuse me, in Judea, Samaria.

So just re-question everything, reestablish a high level of readiness and don't let this happen again. And then hold Hamas accountable. They are not fighters. They are terrorists and they need to be held to account for this. And in addition to terrorizing Israel, they've been terrorizing the Palestinian people of Gaza for the last 10 years as well. So from my perspective, that's the intelligence issue.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Thanks, Mark. We've got a little under 10 minutes, would like to open up for Q&A and any discussion between us would be welcome. Mark, you've got that?

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery:

Well, I first want to ask Tal if he had any thoughts on what he's heard over the last little bit.

Mr. Tal Inbar:

Well, I agree completely with what you both said. The world is watching. I just want to remind us all that there was an official response by Kim Jong-Un supporting Hamas activities. So it's not only a local conflict or local war. Iran is watching, other organizations are watching, and I believe that North Korea, Russia, Iran are also watching and waiting to see the reaction of the United States. To hear twice in two days from President Biden and sending Secretary of State here to Israel in such a short notice...50 years ago when Henry Kissinger came to Israel, it was much later in the campaign and it was only about supplying arms and dealing with the third army of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. So I think it's like John said. It is a clash of civilizations with immense influence on regional and international relations for decades, at least decades to come.

So it's much too early to see the endgame, not only from our side. Of course, we will prevail and we will win, but the aftermath is for the world to learn and it will be something that the world never saw before. Just the magnitude of the events in terms of civilian casualties is more than 10 times 9/11.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery:

Okay, John, over to you. Yeah.

Mr. John Rood:

One comment I was going to add, Mark, if it's okay, is I think the other thing that changed from recent years is that I think the enemy, in this case, Hamas and the Iranians, they sensed a moment not only of the anniversary of Yom Kippur War, but a moment in time where, unfortunately, Israeli society has been split. And you've seen this play out in the political realm, differences over the future of the Netanyahu-led government and other things. And I will say for those that don't follow Israeli political life that closely, there's a tendency to associate, it must be similar to the split in the United States with Trump Republicans and Democrats, and I would say it's different. There are some outward similarities to that, but there's some more fundamental things and so that it was impacting the military readiness and other things. It's not, I think, something the Israelis want to feature, but this did impact the Israeli Air Force readiness and reserve pilots and others.

And so one of the things that needs to, that you've seen a unity government formed and General Gantz and other very experienced people coming together in a wartime cabinet and so

I'm hopeful that that produces some benefit there as well, if any silver lining can come from this dark cloud from the attacks.

But we in the United States need to pay attention to that as well because our enemies are looking at the same kind of divisions within the United States society and trying to assess when is the time. And a lot of deterrence where there's a clash like this is, is the right time that the enemy or the potential adversary is assessing? So part of maintaining deterrence is signaling to the adversary now is not the time, now is not the period. Maybe next month, maybe next year. Because I don't think you will ever get to a point where the society forgives and the Palestinians the idea that they want to eliminate Israel from the face of the earth, but rather is this a time when they're deterred sufficiently or it would be too much of a setback or a loss of honor or some shameful event to be defeated that they, therefore, don't attack?

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

Hey, thanks. Tal-

Maj Gen (Ret.) Charles "Corky" Corcoran:

John, I'll pile onto that. [inaudible 00:58:13]

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

Go ahead, Corky.

Maj Gen (Ret.) Charles "Corky" Corcoran:

Real quick. I think oftentimes these autocratic societies or these organizations like Hamas look at the discourse that's happening in a republic like ours or what's going on in Israel, the normal discourse that happens in an open society and perceive it as weakness and deterrence fails. And so the way to fix that is to strike back like we talked about very quickly and very soundly.

And then, Mark, to a comment you made, I couldn't agree more. I think it's a wonderful idea where you talked about an appropriation for democracies that are under attack around the world by these autocrats. I think that would send a very strong deterrent message. Thanks.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

Thanks. And so got a couple of quick questions. I want to throw the first two to Tal. One's easy because I do know the answer. First is the Iron Beam System operational yet and being used? And then the second, we all know Iron Dome only selects some of the targets it hit. It does a fantastic job. Once it does that, was the intercept rate this weak. Are they advertising or putting out yet? Was it in the 90 to 95 or has Hamas figured something out about that as well? Over to you, Tal.

Mr. Tal Inbar:

Yeah. So we don't have official data yet to be released, so I cannot comment on this. And the same applies to incorporation of new systems like the one that we are now developing, the laser. There will be time to share the data and to analyze it, but now, as you all know, we are fighting, so it's not the correct time.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Hey, Mark, we might have to wrap this up pretty quickly. Go ahead.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

No. So that's good. What I'd like to do is go around the horn. I'll start with Corky, then John and Tal, then me and then I'll throw it to you, everybody one minute or less. So go ahead, Corky.

Maj Gen (Ret.) Charles "Corky" Corcoran:

Thanks to the panel. Thanks, Riki, for hosting. Tal, again, our sympathies are with you and our forces are with you, and we're going to stand strong next to you. Over.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

All right. John.

Mr. John Rood (Nick):

Just thank you for having me on. And, again, I think we're going to have... This bears close watching and our hearts are with our friends in Israel and we stand ready to help.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

Thanks. Tal?

Mr. Tal Inbar:

Well, thank you for the support and, Riki, I hope to have such events not only in wartime, but then again it's something that the world never saw before and it's unprecedented. So we will have to watch and see what is going on and we might have another talk not too far in the future.

RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgoery:

That's great, Tal. Thanks. Maybe we'll do that when you're allowed to tell us some numbers on Iron Dome and Iron Beam.

But hey, I just want to add that that's a serious thing. I think that's supplemental. You might have to throw in some border money as well. But the idea of a beleaguered democracy supplemental, I think, is going to gain a lot of traction in both the House and the Senate and it'll solve three, kill

three birds with one stone. Let's hope that that could happen soon and that we get a house speaker soon.

All right, Riki. Over to you to close us out.

Mr. Riki Ellison:

Thanks, everyone. Just an excellent discussion.

It's always dramatic or traumatic when you have to have this kind of loss to make change and if you don't make change, we should make change without having to go through this, but change is not going to happen. And as John pointed out, the reasoning not to have this looked at is not out there. If you're a nation near, you have to have this operational, deployed and fully integrated all the way up from drones to hyper and you have to be able to apply it with your offense for that deterrent.

That's what's happened. It's cost a lot of lives and it's still going to escalate. We've got to be able to figure out how to deescalate that and we're doing the best we can. But that might take, again, another perspective outside of the windows that we look at stuff to change this and it's challenging. We got to have the best of the best.

So thank you for enlightening. This is an enlightenment here, to the public, to who listens to this. Really appreciate your time and effort to come on and express your well-educated viewpoints on this and let's make the world safer. Let's make Israel safer. We said a couple things. We got to make the world safer. So ladies and gentlemen, thank you. Great session. Bye-bye.