“Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, from El Segundo, California, from a beautiful southern day in southern California. I’m Riki Ellison. I’m the founder and chairman of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.
We are pretty excited about our 100th Missile Defense Congressional Roundtable that you’re hearing today. It wasn’t planned. This came up on relevancy to the warfighter and to the fight in the Middle East. And it’s great that it’s here because it’s where I was introduced to missile defense 40 plus years ago with Edward Teller, Ronald Reagan, and it was also pretty awesome yesterday, I was at the White House to have some time with Newt Gingrich, who also was a huge supporter of missile defense during the tough years of missile defense in the 90s and even the 80s. But as he shaped this, and we both with affirmation, knew we were right and smiled about it.
So it’s great that we’re here at this place, at this juncture, where we’ve got some time. Time is critical for us as we relook at what we can do to ensure that our troops, wherever they are in the Middle East—water, land bases, wherever they are—are better defended than they were three weeks ago or a month ago when this fight started. And this is the point of our advocacy, our illumination, and our education of truth.
This has to be a priority. And I think we are struggling not making this a priority and putting other things in front of this as a priority. No question, we have the resources. We’ve got $1.3 trillion. We’ve got resources that’s done. We haven’t applied those to where we need to go in the defense of our bases.
So welcome to our 100th Congressional Roundtable. As I look back, the first one was back in 2014 at the Rayburn Building. We used to do these things live. And it was also on the topic of operations of missile defense, both globally and regionally. Isn’t it amazing? 14 years ago, when we first did our first one, I believe we had Sam Greaves, we had Dick Formica, we had some of the oldies, Craig Franklin was on that aspect of it.
Okay, so I’m looking at this. I’m going to give you a football term because I’m going to go there a little bit with you on this. You know, we had a hell of a half, and we put some points up on that board. But our defense let them score. And we have to make adjustments now. And those ceasefire days have given us time and effort, energy, leadership to make adjustments. And when you get beat in the half, you have to recognize what your problems are and adjust very, very quickly to doing this.
It’s a road game. And one of the great things about the 49ers under Bill Walsh is we never lost our road games. It’s hard to do it. It’s hard to win in the road. And we are in the road right now with it.
So when you first look at the breakdown of our defensive scheme, because it’s been a breakdown of our defensive scheme, our defensive coordination, and you’re going to have to go high to be able to change the entire defensive strategy. And you can do that. That’s what time takes to be able to look at the bigger issue before you start picking apart on the pieces. You have to look at why this is not a priority, who’s in charge of making it a priority, and putting capacity and capability in there as fast as possible. You may have to look at a new defensive coordinator. I’ve seen that happen. You may need to look at a whole new scheme, because the facts are that we did not cover the flats. We’ve got great coverage deep. We can cover anything deep. And we’ve got a hell of a pass rush. But we’ve got slow, old linebackers that can’t cover a simple dump pass in the flat. That’s the fact.
So whether you want to continue with your same scheme and your same old linebackers, which a lot of teams do, because they don’t have the courage to make that adjustment, you’re going to get your ass beat. So we have to bench some of these players. And we have to put in rookies that are unproven and put them in there to cover the damn flat.
That’s where we’re at. I’ve been over there, seen it, understand it. We have processes that have to stop. Our processes are made for acquisition and development to put stuff on the field for bigger systems that require a lot more time and energy. The fight is happening every single day, innovation, and we’re not adjusting to that.
So there are a lot of layers here. And we’ve got the best that I thought we could bring to the table. We’ve got OSD policy covered, because I think a lot of this starts with policy, man, to go all the way to the top, to where our policy priorities are as a nation, as a Department of War from the region to defense versus offense. Everybody wants to score. Everybody wants to spend money on that. Policy has to be addressed with this. And I want to go into the processes, the acquisition processes that we have fought with the last 20 years for those weapon systems that need all that, but we haven’t adjusted to that innovation as of yet.
And we’ve got Charlie here as a warfighter, because you need to hear the warfighter. It’s not about acquisitions, but we’re fighting what we need to save American lives. And then we’ve got Mark here that’s going to give us the success story, because there is success, because somebody did this right. And that’s on the water. They did it right. And over the last couple of days, that Aegis has taken on everything they could throw at them and they’ve defeated it. And we got to get that thing going here. And Mark’s going to give us a perspective, because he’s fighting that battle that we’ll fought to try to force this to have capability, to have cruise missile capability, to have counter-UAS capability. We’ve been on and we’ve been right.
So I want to open the flow up a little bit for a solution. I know we can bitch about the problem, but we got to create a solution and we got to do it now. Already three weeks I don’t think that has been done. We’re going to go back and fight and we better be able to defend our lives and our infrastructure.”
– Riki Ellison, 100th MDAA Virtual CRT
I. Executive Overview
The Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA) convened its 100th Congressional Roundtable under the title “Epic Fury Halftime Adjustments: Defense Wins World Championships” to assess operational failures, policy shortcomings, and urgent adaptation requirements emerging from the ongoing conflict environment in the Middle East. Led by MDAA Founder and Chairman Riki Ellison, the discussion brought together General (Ret.) Charles Flynn, former Commander of U.S. Army Pacific; Rear Admiral (Ret.) Mark Montgomery; and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood. The roundtable focused on the inability of current U.S. force protection architectures, acquisition systems, and command structures to rapidly adapt to the growing missile, drone, and autonomous warfare threat.
The discussion repeatedly returned to one central argument: the United States military and policy establishment remain structurally optimized for slow-moving programs of record and high-end traditional warfare, while adversaries and partners alike are demonstrating the effectiveness of rapidly adaptable, low-cost, software-driven, distributed defensive systems. The panelists argued that the failure is not technological capability alone, but institutional inertia, risk aversion, fragmented authorities, and an inability to incorporate lessons from Ukraine, Israel, and allied operations into real-time operational defense.
Throughout the discussion, the panel framed the current strategic environment as a “halftime adjustment” moment for U.S. defense policy. While American offensive strike capability remains globally dominant, the defensive architecture protecting American forces, air bases, command centers, and logistics hubs has proven vulnerable to low-cost drone swarms, distributed missile attacks, and persistent autonomous systems. The panelists warned that unless rapid changes occur in command relationships, acquisition authorities, operational experimentation, and integrated air and missile defense posture, the United States risks strategic surprise and increasing operational losses in future conflicts — particularly against China.
II. Strategic Themes and Major Discussion Areas
Failure of Current Defensive Architecture
Riki Ellison opened the discussion by arguing that U.S. air and missile defense doctrine has failed to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. Using football analogies throughout the discussion, Ellison described the United States as possessing elite offensive “pass rushers” capable of deep strike operations, but lacking the agile, distributed, short-range defenses needed to protect forces from cheap drones and cruise missile attacks. He argued that the United States remains overinvested in exquisite high-end systems while underinvesting in scalable, rapidly fieldable counter-drone and point defense capabilities.
Ellison repeatedly emphasized that the issue is not a lack of national resources but a failure of prioritization. He noted that the United States possesses sufficient financial capacity but continues to funnel resources into legacy acquisition pathways instead of rapidly adapting to battlefield realities. He argued that the inability to protect American forces on bases in the Middle East demonstrated systemic failures in policy, operational command structures, and acquisition culture.
Acquisition Reform and Institutional Inertia
General Charles Flynn argued that the Department of Defense already possesses most of the authorities needed to rapidly field defensive technologies. He cited Operational Needs Statements (ONS), Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs), Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs), Quick Reaction Capabilities (QRCs), and middle-tier acquisition authorities as mechanisms already provided by Congress.
Flynn argued that the primary obstacle is cultural rather than legal or organizational. According to Flynn, the Pentagon remains trapped in a “program of record” mindset dominated by legacy sustainment structures and bureaucratic incentives that favor slow procurement cycles over operational adaptation. He warned that promising technologies known to commanders in the field are routinely delayed or buried because acquisition organizations prioritize established programs over rapidly deployable capabilities.
A major theme in Flynn’s remarks was the need for senior commanders and service secretaries to personally intervene and “grab the steering wheel” away from acquisition bureaucracies. He stressed that operational commanders must force rapid adoption of effective systems instead of allowing them to disappear into traditional procurement timelines. Flynn also emphasized that experimentation, testing, exercises, and operational fielding must occur simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Lessons from Ukraine and Allied Adaptation
Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery focused heavily on the operational lessons emerging from Ukraine. He argued that the United States has failed to systematically study or integrate Ukrainian innovations in drone defense, distributed sensing, command and control, and low-cost interception.
Montgomery described Ukraine’s layered drone defense networks as highly adaptive systems built around acoustic sensors, infrared tracking, radar integration, and rapidly distributed warning systems operating across largely unclassified networks. He emphasized that Ukrainian forces have accepted imperfect but scalable defensive systems, often relying on interceptor weapons costing between $1,000 and $5,000 with lower individual probability-of-kill rates but overwhelming cumulative effectiveness.
Montgomery contrasted this with the American tendency to seek near-perfect defensive systems at extremely high cost. He argued that multiple inexpensive interceptors with moderate kill probabilities can achieve defensive outcomes comparable to million-dollar missiles while dramatically improving defensive capacity.
He also highlighted how the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system has evolved into a software-driven warfighting ecosystem capable of rapidly incorporating battlefield observations into operational upgrades. Montgomery noted that some destroyers now receive rapid software and doctrinal updates within days or weeks, enabling continuous adaptation — a process he argued other services have failed to emulate.
Policy Failure and Strategic Misjudgment
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood argued that policy leaders fundamentally misjudged the character of the current conflict environment. Rood stated that the United States continues to underestimate the degree of coordination between Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, and proxy organizations operating across multiple theaters.
Rood argued that policymakers failed to fully recognize missiles and drones as primary instruments of modern warfare rather than supporting capabilities. He criticized the persistent belief that offensive operations alone can suppress missile and drone attacks, pointing to repeated historical failures in conflicts involving Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran-backed militias.
He further argued that the United States has failed to organize itself to rapidly incorporate allied innovations into operational force structures. Rood repeatedly emphasized that policy leadership must establish empowered organizations capable of accelerating experimentation, rapidly fielding allied technologies, and integrating battlefield lessons into operational doctrine.
A major concern raised by Rood was that the United States is “not operating at the speed of relevance” and is failing to behave like a nation actively engaged in war.
III. Operational and Strategic Analysis
The discussion revealed a broad consensus among all participants that the current U.S. approach to integrated air and missile defense is too centralized, too risk-averse, and too dependent on long-cycle acquisition systems. While each participant emphasized different dimensions of the problem, the overarching strategic assessment was remarkably consistent.
Ellison framed the issue operationally: the United States is winning offensive exchanges while simultaneously failing to adequately protect forces and infrastructure. Flynn framed the issue institutionally: authorities and technologies already exist, but the bureaucracy refuses to move at wartime speed. Montgomery framed the issue technologically and operationally: allies such as Ukraine are already demonstrating effective distributed counter-drone architectures that the United States has not adopted. Rood framed the issue strategically and politically: policy leadership has failed to recognize the true nature of modern warfare and has not reorganized the system to support rapid adaptation.
One of the most important concepts discussed was the need for “open” command and control architectures. Multiple speakers argued that existing U.S. C2 systems remain too rigid and service-centric to rapidly integrate allied or commercial technologies. The panel repeatedly emphasized that future defense architectures must be modular, software-driven, interoperable, and capable of rapidly incorporating foreign systems and battlefield innovations.
Another major issue raised was the tradeoff between risk elimination and risk mitigation. Montgomery argued that the military must learn to accept imperfect systems in order to rapidly expand defensive coverage. He contrasted American risk aversion with Ukrainian operational pragmatism, noting that wartime adaptation often requires deploying systems that are only partially mature but operationally useful.
The discussion also underscored the growing centrality of software, networking, and data fusion to modern missile defense. The panelists repeatedly returned to examples from the Navy’s Aegis ecosystem as evidence that rapid software iteration and doctrinal adaptation can significantly improve combat effectiveness without requiring entirely new physical platforms.
Collectively, the discussion reflected an emerging shift in strategic thinking away from platform-centric warfare and toward adaptive, networked, software-defined defense ecosystems. The participants warned that adversaries such as China are likely observing current conflicts closely and will aggressively exploit any institutional rigidity, command fragmentation, or inability to adapt in future high-end conflict scenarios.
IV. Key Strategic Takeaways
• Modern missile and drone warfare favors adaptability, speed, scalability, and software integration over traditional acquisition timelines.
• The Department of Defense already possesses emergency acquisition authorities but lacks institutional willingness to aggressively employ them.
• The United States has failed to fully integrate operational lessons from Ukraine into force protection doctrine and counter-drone architectures.
• Distributed, low-cost defensive systems with moderate kill probabilities may provide more effective layered defense than limited numbers of exquisite interceptors.
• Current command-and-control systems remain too rigid to integrate allied and commercial systems at wartime speed.
• Policy leadership has underestimated the strategic importance of drones and missiles as primary tools of modern warfare.
• Future deterrence against China will require fundamentally different approaches to integrated air and missile defense.
V. Conclusion
The “Epic Fury Halftime Adjustments” Virtual CRT represented a sharp and unusually candid critique of current U.S. military adaptation processes. Rather than focusing exclusively on technical shortcomings, the panel identified institutional culture, bureaucratic inertia, fragmented command relationships, and strategic misjudgment as the primary barriers to effective defense modernization.
The discussion demonstrated that many of the technologies and authorities required to improve force protection already exist. The central challenge is whether senior military leaders, policymakers, and acquisition officials possess the urgency and willingness to rapidly integrate battlefield lessons into operational force structures.
The panelists collectively argued that future success in missile and air defense will depend less on individual high-end platforms and more on adaptive command architectures, software-defined warfare, rapid experimentation, allied integration, and scalable distributed defenses. The conflict environment emerging in the Middle East and Ukraine was portrayed not as a regional anomaly, but as a preview of future warfare against peer competitors.
The strategic warning throughout the roundtable was unmistakable: unless the United States rapidly changes its defensive “scheme,” adversaries will continue exploiting institutional rigidity faster than the Pentagon can adapt.
Speakers:
RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, Former Director of Operations, U.S. Pacific Command
GEN (Ret.) Charlie Flynn, Former Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific
Mr. John Rood, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Mr. Riki Ellison, Founder & Chairman, MDAA
Click here to view the transcript